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Japan and Panama: Who is Setting the Aenda?l
Introduction
Panama is second only to the United States as a host country
for Japan's direct overseas investment.2 Japan is the second
largest user of the Panama Canal. Moreover the Japanese
government is participating in a Commission to Study Alternat-ives
to the Panama Canal, that was established in June 1986, together
with the Panamanian government and the United States. Although
evidently the United States has always been Panama's number one
foreign policy concern, Japan is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant country for Panama.3
This raises some interesting questions about U.S.-Japan rela-
tions, and the role Japan is playing in Panama. Whose interests
are being served? is Japan competing with the United States? or
1 The author is a research economist in the Panamanian Center
for Research and Social Action, CEASPA. This paper will draw on
research carried out between 1986 and 1989, some of which
appeared in the study Japan and the United States: Stakes in the
Future of the Panama Canal, USJP Occasional Paper 88-12, Program
on U.S.-Japan Relations, Center for International Affairs, Har-
vard University, 1988. This paper was presented at the XV Inter-
national Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,
Miami, December 1989.
2 As of March 31, 1988, Japanese investment in the United States
amounted to US$50,159 million: in Panama $11,146, Indonesia
$9,218 million, and in the United Kingdom $6,598 million. See
Japan 1989 An International Comparison, Keizai Koho Center,
Tokyo, April 30, 1989, p. 56.
3 General Noriega even sought "the good offices of Japan" to help
negotiate a settlement to the political crisis in Panama after
the annulment of the general elections in May 1989, according to
the National Information System of Panama. He made the request in
an interview with Japanese journalists. UPI, "Noriega asks Japan
to help end crisis", Tropic Times, June 2, 1989, p. 24.
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is it a complementary strategy? what does this triangular rela-
tionship have to tell us about "spheres of influence"? burden
sharing? about the possibilities of Panama's breaking away from
dependence on the United States?
In the following, these questions will be looked at through
the prism of the historical background, a specific look at the
future of the Panama Canal issue, the peculiar nature of Japanese
trade and investment in Panama, political relations, and pros-
pects for the future.
Historical Background
Panama was the first area of Latin America to be visited by
Japanese after their forced reentry into contact with the outside
world in 1853. The Panama railroad was the route chosen to cross
the American continent for the official Japanese mission to the
United States, in 1860. This was their first encounter with a
railway, and "an electrical device made of wire, over which busi-
ness may be transacted between Panama and Aspinwall, (today's
Colon), a distance of 57 miles, in the time it takes for a
smoke". "How it works I have not the faintest idea", confessed
one of the members of the mission in his diary. 4
The first human contact was not promising, though somewhat
prescient of things to come. Referring to the local population,
4 Masakiyo Yanagawa, The First Japanese Mission to America
(186Q), translated into English by Junichi Fukuyama and Roderick
H. Jackson, (J.H. Thompson & Co. Ltd., Kobe, Japan, 1937,
reprinted by Scholary Resources, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware,
1973), p.35.
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the ambassador wrote: "The natives were brown and their hair very
curly. They were naked and barefooted and their character was
bad. Although the character of the natives worried the Americans
they could do nothing to correct the conditions because this is
Spanish territory."5 The Panamanians, for their part, were dis-
appointed in their expectations of the long awaited Ambassadors
from Japan. The newspaper of the day noted, "a great crowd
gathered eagerly awaiting the Japanese. But they lost interest
right away--no doubt they were expecting something different,
instead of which they were disenchanted, as the Japanese are
nothing but Chinamen, only they appear to be more civilized". e
Forty years after this encounter, when Japanese contract
labor was being used on a large scale in Peru and Mexico, condi-
tions in Panama were considered to be too bad to send Japanese
workers. Though nine thousand Japanese laborers were transported
to Mexico between 1901 and 1906 to work on the Central Railway,
the Oaxaqueia sugar plantation and coal and copper mines7 and the
needs for labor for the construction of the Panama Canal would
have seemed an ideal opportunity for Japanese contractors, "an
inspection team from Japan, representatives of large contractors
of Japanese labor, reported the Isthmus too unsafe to risk the
lives of their men".8
5 ibid. p.34.
6 Juan Antonio Susto, "Los Japoneses visitan el Istmo de Panama
por primera vez, en 1860", Lria,, (May 1961), vol. VI. no. 66,
p. 19, quoting from La Estrella de Panama, 26 April, 1860.
7 Maria Elena Ota Mishima, Siete Migraciones Japoneses en Mxico
1890-1978, El Colegio de Mxico, 1982, p. 51.
8 From David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: the Creation
of the Panama Canal. 1870-1914, (Simon and Schuster, New York,
1977), p. 473.
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Other destinations in Latin America for emigrants from Japan
in the first decades of this century, due to concern about over-
crowding in the home islands, were Chile and Brazil, Paraguay and
Bolivia. Central America and Panama were not attractive areas for
organized emigration from Japan, so the few Japanese immigrants
came on their own.
However, shipping was already a high priority sector in the
Japanese economy and the opening of the Panama Canal increased
the opportunities for expansion in this sector. Prior to the
opening of the Canal, Japanese trade with the United States con-
sisted in the export of raw silk to Seattle or San Francisco
where it continued by rail to New York. Imports were in
machinery and raw cotton, which came mainly from the east or
southern United States, and travelled to Japan via the Suez
Canal .8
With the opening of the Canal, freight rates became cheaper,
though the time taken for shipping goods between Asia and the
United States east coast was longer than by the ship and rail
route. Raw silk was a high-priced commodity, so time was of the
essence; once the price of raw silk came down, it became more
profitable to use this cheaper route.10
9 William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the NYK 1870-1914: Business
Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry, Harvard East Asian
Monographs, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1984.
10 Keiichiro Nakagawa, "Japanese Shipping in the 19th and 20th
Centuries: Strategy and Organization" in Business History of
ShipDing, ed. Tsunehiko Yuyi and Keiichiro Nakagawa, Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1985, p. 13.
_ _1__________11__________I___
Another route that used the Canal was initiated -in 1917, by
the OSK line, opening a South America line via East Africa to
carry goods and emigrants to Brazil.ll It took coal from Natal,
South Africa, en route and, for lack of a direct return cargo for
Japan, OSK carried Brazilian coffee from Santos to New Orleans,
where it was replaced with raw cotton for Japan, which went
through the Canal.
Japanese shipping policy from an early date was designed to
promote international trade and to earn foreign exchange, not
just to carry Japanese trade. In order to assure independence
from foreign carriers, the shipping policy included construction,
so that while in 1854 Japan had not one single ocean-going ves-
sel, by 1900 Japan was fourth in world wide new construction ton-
nage, behind the British, the United States and Germany, and its
merchant fleet was eleventh in size.1 2 By 1920, Japan had the
third largest merchant fleet in the world and shipping was built
up to such an extent, to carry both Japanese and third-country
trade, that during the inter-war years shipping was the third
largest earner of foreign exchange for the Japanese economy.13
The Second World War brought about a break in the pos-
sibilities for development of closer relations between Japan and
Panama. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States was
11 ibid. p. 17.
12 Thorsten Rinman and Rigmor Brodefors, The Commercial History
of Shipping, translated by Peter Hogg, Gothenburg, Sweden: Rinman
& Linden AB, 1983.
13 Nakagawa, 1985, op. cit. See also article by Ryoichi Miwa,
"Maritime Policy in Japan: 1868-1937",pp. 123-156, in the same
volume.
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particularly nervous about the possibilities of damage to the
Panama Canal. Not only did the United States adopt a policy of
internment of Japanese nationals in the United States, but
Japanese residents of twelve Latin American States were also sent
to the United States for internment. Those from the five states
of Central America and from Panama were sent to New Orleans, for
detention in Texas, in March 1942.14
Once again after the War, shipping and shipbuilding were
priority sectors and by 1955 Japan became the foremost shipbuild-
ing nation in the world. 1 5 This position was maintained until
the early 1980s, when orders in Korean shipyards topped those in
Japan. The Panama Canal regained its importance for Japan after
the War, as Japan imported vast quantities of raw materials to
feed its industrial development. By 1960, two thirds of all the
seaborne transport in coal and iron in the world went to Japan. is
In 1972 29 percent of all the cargo going through the Canal was
en route between Japan and the United States, and it was calcu-
lated that nearly 11 percent of Japan's oceanborne commerce
passed through the Panama Canal.1 7 The comparable figures for
14 Charles Harvey Gardiner, "The Japanese and Central America"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 14, no.
1, February 1972, p. 22.
15 Rinman and Brodefors, op. cit., p. 101.
16 ibid. p. 103.
17 The 29% figure was calculated from the Panama Canal Company,
Canal Zone Government Annual Report, Fiscal year ended June 30,
1972, tables 21 and 22. The 11% figure was quoted in Norman J.
Padelford and Stephen R. Gibbs, Maritime Commerce and the Future
of the Panama Canal, Cambridge: Cornell Maritime Press, Inc.
1975, p. 72, taken from Shipping and Canal Operations, Hearing
before the Subcommitee on Panama Canal of the Committee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 93rd Con-
gress, Ist session, July 17, 1973, Ser. No. 93-19, pgs. 4, 12.
The 1986 figures come from the Panama Canal Commission Annual
Report 1987, and from tables prepared by the Office of Executive
__ ~ II· ~ ____ __ -------- _ _I
-7-
1986 are 21 percent of total cargo on the U.S.-Japan route, and
5.3 percent of Japan's seaborne trade volume used the Panama
Canal.
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 was a a heavy blow to
all users of that Canal. It had enormous repercussions on ship-
ping, particularly on the size and design of bulk carriers. Once
ships had to be routed round the Cape of Good Hope, it made sense
to realize the economies of scale in large size ships, as
previously they had been restricted by the size of the Canal, to
70,000 deadweight ton tankers loaded, and 150,000 dwt tankers
unloaded. Japan exploited that insight in its shipbuilding
strategy, and the day of the Very Large and Ultra Large Crude
Carriers was born.
After the war, when cleanup of sunken ships could begin, plus
a US$1 billion expansion program to attempt to win back some of
the lost traffic, Japanese money, dredging companies and technol-
ogy were active in the Suez Canal. The Penta-Ocean Construction
Company was prime among them. It had held a dredging contract
with the Suez Canal since 1961, and developed specialized dredg-
ing technology. 1
The Japanese government in general paid a great deal more
attention to the Middle East after the Suez Canal was closed, and
particularly after the first oil shock in 1973, when Japan's oil
Planning.
18 M. Fujimori, "The Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd," The
Oriental Economist May 1980, p. 32, and "The Second Panama Canal
Project", Japan uarterly, XXVII, No. 3 (July-September, 1980) p.
305.
__ ·· ____1_1 _ ·
supplies were cut off. These events spurred the awareness in
Japanese decision-making circles of the need to adopt more active
measures to prevent such sudden and drastic disruptions of their
economic development.
There were some direct links between the Suez Canal project
and Japan's interest in the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal had
traditionally been seen as a United States concern. During the
time in the sixties that the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Studies Commission was conducting studies for a sea-level canal
across the isthmus between Mexico and Colombia, the Japanese were
consulted, and expressed interest in the United States building a
new canal. However, as the Executive Director, Colonel John P.
Sheffey later told Congress,
"When we touched on construction money, the attitude was it's
a United States problem.... Why should we Japanese get involved
in this complicated problem of relations with Panama?"1s
However, as it became clearer that the United States and
Panama were entering into a different relationship, with the
Panama Canal Treaties of 1977, the Japanese realized that it was
in their interests to get involved. They could no longer continue
to rely on the United States to keep the Canal open and operating
efficiently. Soon it would be a Panamanian responsibility, and
they were anxious to ensure that that responsibility would be
19 Statement by Colonel John P. Sheffey, former Executive Direc-
tor of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Commission, before
the United States Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Subcommittee of the Panama Canal and Outer Con-
tinental Shelf, Hearings on the Sea-level Canal Studies. 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 21, 27, 28 June, 1978, p. 312.
carried out. Just as the Japanese government had worked with the
Egyptian government in the expansion of the Suez Canal, so Japan
was interested in promoting actions in Panama that would help to
keep the operation flowing smoothly, and to ensure that the Canal
capacity would meet the need for seaborne transport of goods,
whether for Japan or for other countries.
The Penta Ocean Co. itself prepared plans for a sea-level
canal in Panama, based on study of the voluminous Anderson Report
in the Library of Congress.20 This they presented to Shigeo
Nagano, retired President of Nippon Steel, and head of the
Japanese Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, who
came to be known as "Mr. Panama" for his enthusiasm for the pro-
ject, and considered himself a latter-day Ferdinand De Lesseps. 21
Uninterrupted sea-lanes have always been of enormous concern
to Japan, which considers itself as a vulnerable country entirely
dependent on the import of raw materials for survival. The criti-
cal straits from Japan's point of view are the Malacca and
Singapore Straits, the Gulf of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the
Panama Canal. The accompanying maps indicate the importance to
Japan of those straits and Canals for Japan's exports and imports
in 1980.
20 M. Fujimori, op. cit., and Interoceanic Canal Studies 1970, by
the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission,
Washington, D.C., 1970, the official title of the Anderson
Report.
21 This was rather ironic in view of the history of De Lesseps-
glorious triumph in building the Suez Canal, and disastrous fail-
ure in Panama. David McCullough tells the story in Path Between
the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1977.
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In a 1983 Ministry of Transport study on the contribution of
maritime transport policy to comprehensive security,22 the
authors point to the availability of substitute routes as
indispensable. If no alternative sea route is available, then a
landbridge or pipelines should be developed. The study points
out that the Panama and Suez Canals serve the function of provid-
ing an alternative route to the other, at least for some com-
modities. (During the time that the Suez Canal was closed, Japan-
related trade using the Panama Canal increased noticeably.)
In some cases, the study indicated, to secure safe passage it
may be necessary to help countries neighbouring on the straits to
develop hydrographic surveys, charts, and navigation signals.
This policy was adopted by Japan in the Straits of Malacca in
1974 and more recently in the Gulf of Hormuz, during the Iran-
Iraq war.
Other means suggested to ensure safe passage include
international cooperation to neighbouring nations to deter mili-
tary and political situations that might cause disruption. The
general idea is to achieve this goal "through stabilization of
the economy and the political situation through friendship with
Japan and economic development".23 This theme had previously been
emphasized by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
MITI:
22 Japan, Transport Policy Council's Subcommittee on Com-
prehensive Security, The Direction of Transportation Policy Rela-
tive to Comprehensive Security: Promotion of International
Cooperation and Maintenance of Transport, Tokyo, 14 February
1983, p. 23.
23 ibid. p. 25.
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"Particularly for an island country like Japan, which is
highly dependent on international trade, ensuring the safety of
its maritime transport is critical to its economic development.
Japan's supply of certain critical materials are concentrated in
a few selected countries. So its dependence on certain sea lanes
is higher than any other industrial country. Therefore, a dis-
ruption of free passage through these sea lanes will have grave
consequences for the economy of Japan. Points on the sea lanes
which are particularly critical to the economic security of Japan
include the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, Panama
Canal, Suez Canal, and the Cape of Good Hope. And not a few
countries bordering on or adjacent to straits or canals, particu-
larly in the Middle East, Central America and southern Africa,
are politically unstable.
In view of this situation, specialized studies must be
carried out on how to ensure safe passage through these points.
In the final analysis, however, the surest insurance of free and
safe passage through these straits and canals lies in the peace
and order of contiguous countries brought about by the smooth
development of their economies and stabilization of their
people's livelihood. Therefore, it is necessary for Japan to
cultivate closer relations with these countries and contribute to
their economic development, that is, to place emphasis on preven-
tive measures, in concert with other industrial nations con-
cerned. "24
This government policy statement reads like a blueprint for
Japan's policy in Panama. Many of Japan's actions in Panama over
the last ten years or so fit into that framework, and represent
an effort to (a) cultivate closer relations, (b) to contribute to
Panama's economic devlopment and (c) to work in concert with
other industrial nations- in this case the United States- to take
preventive measures.
The Panama Canal Issue Today
Japan's initital interest in the Panama Canal in the
seventies was in a sea-level canal. This was a time of global
24 Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Economic
Security of JaDan 1982. Background Information B1-49, Tokyo,
1982, p. 12-13.
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trade expansion, not just of the Japanese economy. Plans for the
Suez Canal in the seventies included both the Phase I expansion
to widen the Canal, that was carried out, and a Phase II to build
a parallel canal, to allow traffic in both directions
simultaneously, that has since been set aside. It was a time
when Japan's demand for raw materials was still expanding, and
the iron and steel industry was one of the hungriest consumers.
Shigeo Nagano, with a lifetime in the steel industry, and
former President of Nippon Steel, the largest steel company in
the world, would have felt personally the need to ensure
guaranteed cheap supplies. A Nippon Steel publicity brochure has
this to say about the tasks of management:
"In resources-poor Japan, the steel industry depends on
imports for most of its principal raw materials, including iron
ore and metallurgical coal. Securing stable supplies of these
raw materials has always been among the most important tasks for
steel management. The Japanese steel industry as a whole is now
producing about 100 million tons of crude steel a year, with its
raw materials imports accounting for nearly half of the world's
total trade volume in these materials.
As Japan's largest steelmaker, Nippon Steel has played a cen-
tral role in arranging for stable supplies of raw materials ...
Nippon Steel was also a pioneer in the use of large ore carriers
to link raw materials shipping ports directly with the steel-
works, thus cutting transportation costs.
The first oil crisis, however, had diverse effects on the raw
materials supply/demand situation. Soaring oil prices triggered
substantial increases in raw materials costs which, together with
rises in the price of bunker oil for ore carriers, placed a great
burden on the management of Japanese steelmakers.
Nippon Steel has taken all possible steps to reduce raw
materials transportation costs, including design of an innovative
energy-efficient ore carrier. At the same time, the company has
tried to maintain good relations with governments in resources-
exporting countries. " 2
25 Nippon Steel Corporation, This is Nippon Steel, Tokyo, pri-
vately printed, nd, p. 20.
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This statement provides plentiful justification -for Nagano's
interest in the Canal. Brazil was always mentioned by Shigeo
Nagano as one of the places from which raw materials would be
routed through a new sea-level canal in Panama. 28 He would have
been personally involved in the initial development stages of the
huge Caraj.s iron ore poject in Brazil, which has iron concentra-
tion of 67%, and reserves for more than 400 years at the planned
annual extraction rate of 35 million tons. This huge project must
have influenced his thinking on the need for cheaper transporta-
tion to Japan.
Other new routes and cargoes mentioned by Nagano and other
Japanese spokesmen as candidates to use a new sea-level canal in
Panama were grains from Brazil, from the Cerrados project 27,
which the Japanese government and private enterprise have been
developing in an attempt to diversify food sources away from the
United States, and oil from Venezuela. At the end of the
seventies, the Japan International Development Center col-
laborated with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America on a
study of possibilities for economic cooperation between Japan and
Latin America, recommending among other things "joint efforts for
the introduction of innovations in maritime transport of bulk
26 Fernando Manfredo, Jr. Deputy Administrator of the Panama
Canal Commission, interview by author, 13 May 1989, in Balboa,
Panama.
27 For an overview of the background to this huge project, cover-
ing an area larger than the whole of the Japanese home islands,
see Paulo San Martin and Bernardo Pelegrini, Cerrados: uma
ocupacao iaponesa no camo, Rio de Janeiro: Editora CODECRI,
1984.
11___1___
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cargoes, like new ocean transportation routes" and mentioning the
second Panama Canal as part of that effort. 28
One of the participants in that study, Professor Akio Hosono,
was to recommend a packet of projects to alleviate geographical
distance and fuel costs and to improve the efficiencies of ocean
and other modes of transport between Japan and Latin America, to
include a second Panama Canal, a Pacific coast port in Mexico,
the Export Corridor project in Brazil, and Asiaport.29 This
would be a huge relay port in southern Japan, "which would
receive mammoth carrier ships from Brazil and transship their
contents in smaller vessels to various destinations in Asia,
including China and other NICs".s3
These huge projects formed part of an elaborate plan
developed in 1977 by the president of the Mitsubishi Research
Institute, Masaki Nakajima, calling for a Global Infrastructure
Fund. The super-projects identified included a Canal across the
Kra Isthmus in Thailand, that would obviate the need to use the
Malacca Straits, providing an alternative access route to the
Indian Ocean; the construction of a second Canal in Panama, and
one in Nicaragua; a global network of Super Ports; greening of
28 United Nations, Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Towards New Forms of
Economic Cooperation Between Latin America and Japan No. 51,
Santiago, Chile, 1987, (Ist edition 1980), p. 57 and 169.
29 Akio Hosono, "Japan and Latin America", in Robert S. Ozaki and
Walter Arnold, Japan's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for
Economic Security, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, p.
222.
30 Leon Hollerman, Japan's Economic Strategy in Brazil: Challenge
for the United States, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988, p. 103.
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the deserts; and electricity generating projects, using solar
heat, sea currents and hydro power. 31
Among the eminent persons whom Nakajima called on to form a
GIF study group in 1981 were Toshio Doko and Saburo Okita, both
of whom were important players in having the Panama Canal plan
converted into a national project.32 As one Japanese reporter
wrote in April 1980, "both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Transport Ministry have adopted a positive attitude toward
the Nagano plan. Although the business and industrial circles
were originally against the idea, they have since come around to
support it after chairman Toshio Doko of the the prestigious
Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations) changed his
position and endorsed it." 3 3
Another important player in getting the Panama Canal project
off the ground in Japan was Kisaburo Ikeura, President of the
Industrial Bank of Japan. From 1975 when Ikeura became Presi-
dent, the watchword in the bank was to push internationalization.
At the time only 10 percent of the bank's profits came from over-
seas, and his aim was to increase that to 20-30 percent. The IBJ
occupies a special role in Japanese banking and the economy. It
was a government bank until 1950, and still maintains close links
with and access to government bureaucrats. The IBJ lists as its
clients 180 of Japan's 200 largest corporations. According to an
31 Masaki Nakajima, "Towards Globalism", Mitsubishi Research
Institute, Research Review, vol.1 no. 1, August 1986, pp.4-5.
32 See L. Hollerman, op. cit. p. 103.
33 N. Fujimori, (1980) op. cit., p. 34. For further information
on the relations between Shigeo Nagano, Toshio Doko and Saburo
Okita see Charlotte Elton, (1988), op. cit., p. 28-29.
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official of Japan's Export-Import Bank: "IBJ is the only bank in
Japan that has the staff, the funds and the power to bring
together all of the big industrial groups."34
The overseas projects in which the IBJ participated in its
drive to internationalize were largely natural resource develop-
ment projects, in aluminum, oil, liquid natural gas, coal and
uranium and iron ore--Carajas being one of them. As the 1982
Annual Report states, "IBJ is Japan's leading bank in the field
of international finance and acts as coordinator, financial
advisor and financier for major natural resources and related
infrastructure development projects overseas."3 5
Ikeura was considered almost a national hero for his role in
obtaining alternative sources of supplies of crude oil, which
would obviate dependence on the volatile and strife-ridden Middle
East, and on transport through the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
The country in which he helped to bring about this coup was
Mexico. The project was for an oil for a loan deal, by which
Mexico offered to supply Japan with 100,000 barrels per day and
the IBJ arranged for a $500 million loan to build a 300 km.
pipeline to Salina Cruz on the Pacific coast. Eventually a joint
venture was established among Japanese private interests, which
included twenty four oil refineries, nine trading companies and
three banks, of which one was the IBJ. 38
34 Stephen Bronte, "Ikeura's international way with IBJ",
Euromonev, (August 1980), p. 36.
35 Industrial Bank of Japan, Annual Report 1982, Tokyo, p. 12.
36 Andrew Spindler, The Politics of International Credit. Private
Finance and Foreign Policy in Germany and Japan, Washington,
DC.: The Brookings Institution, 1984, p. 166.
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As regards the Canal project, by mid-1980 Kisaburo Ikeura was
trying to obtain co-financing for his "pet scheme", from the
Japanese Export-Import Bank, the World Bank and the U.S.
government, as the expected $12-13 billion cost was too much for
Japanese banks to cover alone.37 By 1986, when the tripartite
Japan-United States-Panama Commission to Study Alternatives to
the Panama Canal was finally established, Ikeura was President of
the Japan-Panama Friendship Association, and in that capacity
invited General Manuel Antonio Noriega to Tokyo, to give a speech
before the members of the Association on Japan and Panama's
mutual interests regarding future alternatives to the Canal.38
In January 1988, the consortium in which the IBJ is partici-
pating was unofficially declared the winner on technical merit of
the contract to carry out the feasibility study of the best
alternative to the Canal, and to write the final report for the
Study Commission. Other members include the Bechtel Corporation
and Stone and Webster Engineering.3e
The IBJ had been active in Panama since 1980, when it parti-
cipated with the World Bank in financing a multimillion dollar
project for developing the Colon Free Zone, at the Atlantic end
of the Canal. In February 1982, a representation office of the
IBJ was established in Panama-- the only others in Latin America
37 S. Bronte (1980), op. cit., p. 40.
38 See General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Los Intereses Mutuos de
Panama Jap6n las Alternativas del Futuro Canalero, speech
given before the Japan-Panama Friendship Association in Tokyo, 12
December 1986, (Panama: Defense Forces) privately printed, 1987.
39 At the time of writing, August 1989, negotiations-are under
way to finalize the terms of the contract, prior to signature.
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being located in Mexico, Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro. The IBJ
also provided a $80 million loan to the central government, and
represents Japan on the creditor committee for Panama, whereas
the Bank of Tokyo performs that role for all other Latin American
countries, except for Panama's neighbours, Costa Rica and Colom-
bia.4
In addition to the IBJ's interest in the Panama Canal studies
project, of particular interest to Japan is the project to widen
the Canal throughout the 9-mile narrow stretch known as Gaillard
Cut, to allow passing of the wide beam ships that use the Canal.
In 1987, 20 percent of ships were over 100 foot beam, and it was
projected that this would increase to 50 percent within 15-20
years. The fear is that longer costly waiting times will be
incurred, unless the Widening project is carried out.
It was apparently to discuss this project that General
Noriega was invited to Japan in 1986, as he noted in his speech
"several sectors in Japan have made known their interest in con-
tributing to the financing and execution of this work (the Cut
Widening project)." 4 1 Panama's President, Eric Arturo Delvalle
later confirmed this to an American journalist, saying "Japan is
more than willing to finance the whole thing 100 percent, both
40 For details of Panama's external debt, see Panama, Contraloria
General, Informe del Contralor General de la RedUblica, Panama,
1986, pp. 190-A and 191-A. On the creditor committees, see Bar-
bara Stallings, "The reluctant giant: Japan and the Latin
American debt crisis", in Susan J. Pharr, ed., Japan and the
Third World, forthcoming.
41 Noriega, (1987) op. cit. p.50.
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the Japanese government and the Industrial Bank, which is very
keen on the idea." 42
The decision on this project, however, lies within the pur-
view of the Panama Canal Commission, a U.S. Federal Agency, and
the project is explicitly excluded from the terms of reference of
the Study Commission. Possible Japanese financing of the project
seems to have been a sensitive subject. Despite the President's
statement, no official overtures were made to Panama Canal Com-
mission officials about Japanese financing of the project.43
There were many reasons which led Japan into favouring parti-
cipation in efforts to upgrade the Canal. It looked positive in
so many dimensions: in addition to providing construction work
for Japanese firms on the grand scale, it involved a developing
country, which could help Japan gain favour with the South; it
would help international trade, and would contribute to the
western alliance by increasing the security value of the Canal to
the United States, a Japanese contribution to burden-sharing. It
was seen as a project that would help the United States, and fur-
ther promote U.S.-Japan relations.
The second Panama Canal project was also used as an example
of how Japan could become an economic power without substantial
42 Allan Dodds Frank, "Everyone wants us" Forbes (23 February
1987), p. 37.
43 Statement by Fernando Manfredo, Jr., Deputy Administrator of
the Panama Canal Commission, in response to questions in CADE 87,
a business-sponsored conference on the Canal in the Year 2000,
Panama, 27 April, 1987. For further details on the ,Cut Widening
project and other alternatives to the Canal, see Charlotte Elton,
"Studies on Alternatives to the Panama Canal", Maritime Policy &
Management, 14, no.4 (October-December 1987), pp. 289-299.
_II ___
- 20 -
military might, through becoming an "aid great power.."44 These
national prestige considerations carry considerable weight and
should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when Japan
is searching for a more active international role, an honored
place in the world community, and to escape from the character-
ization of being an "economic giant, political pygmy".45
After three years of meetings of a Preparatory Committee,
from 1982-1985, the terms of reference for the Study Commission
were finally agreed upon by the three governments involved, in
September that year, during a meeting of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. The Study Commission itself was finally estab-
lished in Panama City in June 1986, but it advanced very slowly
due to delays by the United States in appointing its delegates to
the Commission.46
C. JAPANESE AID, TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN PANAMA
Japan's involvement with Panama stems from the 1970's, when
private sector and official attention was drawn to the country as
44 Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and
Japanese Foreign Policy, Studies of the East Asian Institute,
Columbia University, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1986, p.
24.
45 See for example Shotaro Yachi's Japan's Search for an Honored
Place in the World Community, paper prepared as a Fellow, Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1988, also Edwin
0. Reischauer, "Can Japan stay an economic giant but a political
pygmy?" Harvard International Review, X, No. 4 (April-May 1988),
p. 27.
46 The Panamanian President Nicolas Ardito Barletta was forced to
step down from his position a few days after the signing of the
agreement to establish the Commission in New York. Though the two
events were unconnected, the change in the Panamanian President
led to a marked cooling of relations between the United States
and Panama.
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a result of the Canal Treaty negotiations. Japanese economic
cooperation with the country shows all the characteristics of
strategic aid, as Panama fits into the category of a country with
which Japan has a relation of economic interdependence, because
of the transit of raw materials and export products through the
Canal, and could be considered a place critical for world peace
and stability. Though Panama could not qualify for assistance on
humanitarian grounds, due to the per capita income of over
$2,000, the other criteria could overwhelm that one in some
cases.
Panama was the first Latin American country to raise money on
the Tokyo capital market, through the use of yen bonds, in March
1978, and appears to have had privileged access to Japanese funds
for loans. At the end of 1987, Japanese financial institutions
held $0.6 billion of Panama's total foreign debt of $4.9 billion,
just over 12 percent.47 This proportion is similar to Japan's
overall exposure to Latin American debt. (Panama was also the
first country to default on a yen bond issue, in March 1988, when
banks in Panama closed after the United States had frozen assets
of the Banco Nacional de Panama.)
Technical assistance projects in Panama covered a variety of
fields, from cartographic and fishing resources surveys, to equi-
pping the National Cancer Institute, and upgrading the telecom-
munication system. Two integrated economic cooperation projects
in which the Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA, is
47 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 March 1988.
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involved are the establishment of an educational television chan-
nel, and a vocational training institute.48 The former gives
local exposure to Japanese culture and programs made in Japan,
while filling an important gap in the programming of commercial
stations. At the Panamanian-Japanese Center, Japanese experts
train their counterparts to improve labour skills in electronics,
auto mechanics, bodywork and painting.
The potential spinoffs for Japanese business are high. The
vocational project could help Japan to resolve a serious handicap
in its sales expansion to Latin America-- the distance from serv-
ice centers. A virtuous circle will be created as the graduates
of the program go to work for local companies selling and servic-
ing Japanese goods. In fact several Japanese companies chose
Panama as their marketing, distribution and service centers for
South America, Toyota and Sony, for example. A Mitsui consult-
ant, in a report to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy,
suggested that a possible land-use for the former Albrook Air
Field, that reverted to Panama under the Canal Treaties, and is
conveniently situated near the Canal and the city, be used as a
hi-tech service center, among other uses.
It is arguable to what extent economic cooperation can
achieve the goals that Japan has proposed for it, namely to
encourage friendship with Japan, promote economic development and
48 The Japanese delegates to the Commission to Study Alternatives
to the Panama Canal are also JICA personnel. The insistence that
the Japanese participation be handled through JICA, according to
Panamanian sources, led to some difficulties in reaching agree-
ment on Commission procedures.
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to stabilize the local economy and political situation. This
should be an important question for Japan, now it is on its way
to becoming the number one aid donor in the world, in dollar
terms. The Panama case, though relatively small figures are
involved, could be an interesting one to evaluate the success of
the strategic aid policy.
Another related project in Panama important for Japan's com-
mercial expansion in Latin America is the Colon Free Zone, a tax
free warehousing operation at the Atlantic entrance to the Canal.
With an annual turnover of goods peaking in 1982 at $4 billion,
it claims to be the largest free zone in the world after Hong
Kong. The goods traded there came primarily from Japan, 23 per-
cent of the total. Goods from Taiwan follow with 15 percent, and
from the United States (11 percent) and Hong Kong (9 percent).4 s
One purpose of the IBJ-World Bank loan for the development of
Colon was to carry out a landfill project to permit expansion of
the Colon Free Zone. A Japanese company, Aoki, was awarded the
contract, for $60 million, in 1981.850
Japanese banks also became active in the international bank-
ing center in Panama particularly since the end of the seventies,
coinciding with deregulation in Tokyo of international financial
49 Data provided by the Statistics Department, Colon Free Zone.
50 Aoki Corporation, Annual Report, 1982. Other contracts won by
Aoki in Panama include the Vacamonte fishing port, financed by
the Bank of Tokyo, and the first phase of the Fortuna Dam
hydroelectric project. Aoki bought the Marriott Hotel, in 1983,
and the Contadora Hotel in 1987. The President of the Aoki Corpo-
ration, Hiryoshi Aoki, is the Director General of the Japan-
Panama Friendship Association, and invited General Noriega to be
guest of honor at his daughter's wedding, during Noriega's trip
to Japan in December 1986.
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operations, and expectations of greater trading links between
Japan, and North and South America. The Bank of Tokyo set up its
Panama operation in 1973. It was followed by the Sanwa Bank
(1978), the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in 1979, the Sumitomo and Mitsui
Banks in 1980, the Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Coporation in
1981 and the Mitsubishi Bank in 1983.
There was a rapid build up of their assets in Panama. By the
end of 1984, they amounted to 17 percent of the $38 billion total
reported to the National Banking Commission. At that time,
Panama's banking center hosted 109 banks, from 25 countries.
Japanese assets were second only to those of the twelve United
States-banks, whose assets that year amounted to 26 percent of
the total, as shown in Table 1. By March 1987, Bank of Tokyo
assets had increased to $1.8 billion, the Sanwa Bank to $1.5 bil-
lion, the Sumitomo Bank, to $1.4 billion.
(A year later, their assets were reduced to a shadow of their
former selves as a result of the instability, rumours of printing
currency, culminating in a nine-week bank closure, from March to
May, 1988.)
Seven of the nine largest Japanese general trading companies,
the sogo shosha, have offices in Panama, all established since
the Mitsubishi Corporation came in 1970. This was the year that
Panama passed its modern banking law, which established the
ground rules for the international banking center. Mitsui,
Sumitomo and C Itoh followed in 1972, Marubeni in 1973,
I____II__II__IC____l___.___l__
Table 
Assets of United States and Japanese Banks in the Panama
Intenrational Banking Center, 1984
(in millions of $)
Bank Assets (12-31-84)
Total all banks 37.955
Total assets in U.S. banks 9,737
First National Bank of Chicago 3,651
American Express Bank (Panama) S.A. 2,531
Chase Manhattan Bank 641
Bank of America N.T. &S.A. 632
Citibank N.A. 586
Citicorp International Bank, S.A.* 537
Meill Lynch International Bank 487
Bankers Trust Co. Inc. 241
Republic National Bank of N.Y., Inc.* 195
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. 130
First National Bank of Boston 102
Banco de Credito Internacional,S.A. 4
Total assets in Japanese banks 6.305
Bank of Tokyo Ltd. 1,330
Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. 1,250
Sanwa Bank, Ltd. 1,043
Da-lchi Kanggo Bank 984
Bank of Tokyo (Panama) S.A.* 686
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corp. 593
Mitsui Bank, Ltd. 380
Mitsubishi Bank (Panama) S.A.* 39
* International license, i.e for offshore business only.
Source: National Banking Commission, Panama.
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Kanematsu-Gosho in 1975, and Nissho-Iwai in 1980.51 A JETRO
office was also established in 1978, as a regional office to
cover Panama and Central America. A director of that office
declared that among the reasons Japanese businessmen liked doing
business in Panama, in addition to stability and good living con-
ditions, the use of the U.S. dollar and the good airline connec-
tions and telecommunications, was that it was a free-flow
information center, where it was easier for a Japanese banker to
meet with his U.S. counterpart than in New York.52
Extraordinary though it may seem, Japan's overseas direct
investment has increased from a mere $112 million in 1977, when
it was behind Mexico ($171 million), Bermuda ($313 million), Peru
($457 million) and Brazil ($1.8 billion), to $11.1 billion in
1988, second only to the United States. The explanation for this
expansion becomes a little clearer by understanding Panama's tax-
haven status, the ease of registry of corporations, and open
registry for ships. According to a JETRO White Paper on FDI in
1987:
"Japanese subsidiaries in Panama are heavily concentrated in
the service sector, such as information, finance and securities
business, which operate either in free zones or the offshore
markets in Panama. Though there are many Japanese paper com-
51 The dates are taken from the Oriental Economist, Japanese
Overseas Investment. A Complete Listing by Firms and Countries.
1984-1985, Tokyo, 1984. Marubeni closed down its office in 1988,
because its operations in Panama had been in banking.
52 The JETRO office is another casualty of the political crisis
in Panama. It closed in March 1989. A regional office is due to
open in Costa Rica in October, 1989.
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panies, there is not a single Japanese subsidiary engaged in
manufacturing business in Panama."53
The law that controls Japanese investment abroad defines it
as to include both acquisitions by the residents of shares issued
by a corporation established under a foreign law, or loans to
such corporations, provided such acquisition or loan is done with
the objective of establishing a permanent economic relation with
the corporation.54
The fact that overseas investment includes loans could
explain why it also appears that Panama does more trade with
Japan than do any of the other Latin American countries, as seen
in Table 2. Trade consists largely of ships, "exported" to
Panamanian subsidiaries of Japanese corporations, presumably
bought with loans from the parent company, which appear in the
overseas investment statistics.
Panamanian statistics show a very different pattern of trade.
In 1986 Japan was Panama's second most important supplier of
imports, after the United States, with $108 million, compared
with $436 million from the United States. (To these should be
added an estimated $30 million worth of Japanese products,
imported to Panama through the Colon Free Zone.) Two years
53 JETRO, JETRO Hakusho Toshishen. 1987: Skai to Nihon no Kaigai
Chokusetsu Toshi--Endaka de Shin Kvyokumen Mukaeta Kaigai Toshi
(JETRO White Paper., 1987 Investment: World and Japanese Foreign
Direct Investment-- Foreign Investment Entered a New Phase in an
Era of the Highly Valued Yen), Tokyo, 1987, "Panama" pp. 82-84.
My thanks to Takako Kishima for the translation.
54 The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control law, as amended
in December 1979, as described by Hiroki Sakamoto, in "Japan's
outward and inward FDI", The CTC Reporter, No. 27 (Spring 1989),
p. 64.
i
TableZ
Japan's Trade with Selected Latin American Countries
1986
Total
Panama
Mexico
Brazil
Exports
9.494
3,197
1,032
973
Imports
6.194
84
1,439
1,875
Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1988 An International ComDarison,
Tokyo 1987, pp. 36-40, from Japan Tariff Association, The Summary
Reort: Trade of JaDan.
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previously, two thirds of the direct imports from Japn were of
vehicles and car parts. On the other side of the coin, Japan
purchased from Panama goods worth a mere $240,000, mainly scrap
metal. The peak value of Panamanian goods exported to Japan was
in 1984, when it reached just under one million dollars.
This dismal imbalance tells its own story of Panama-Japan
relations. Between 1983 and 1987, Panama pursued a policy of
structural adjustment aimed at increasing exports to help pay the
foreign debt, in accordance with World Bank and International
Monetary Fund prescriptions. Despite the extensive nature of
economic and financial links between Panama and Japan existing at
the time, Panama was unable to exert any leverage to raise the
paltry level of commodity exports to Japan. On the contrary, it
declined.
The Panamanian ship registry has expanded greatly, and
Japanese-owned ships were responsible for more than 20 percent of
the increase between 1978 and 1984, when the total Panama flag
fleet tonnage increased from 27.6 million deadweight tons to 62.1
million dwt.55 Whereas in 1978 Japan had 30 percent of its total
open registry under the Panamanian flag, by 1984 that percentage
had increased to over 55 percent, Table 3, indicating a marked
preference for the Panama registry over the many competing ones,
(twenty of them according to a recent count). These data are
confirmed by the growing importance of Panamanian consulates in
55 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 1978, United Nations: New
York, 1981, p. 11, and UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 1984,
United Nations: New York, 1985, p. 10.
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Table 3
Use of the Panama Flog, 1978-1984
Percentage in
1978
Total open registry tonnage 14
Total open registry ships 35
Jepan's open registry tonnage 30
Japan's open registry ships 63
U.S. open registry tonnage 10
U.S. open registry ships 26
Panama
1984
31
60
55
83
15
43
Source: Author's calculations from UNCTAD Review of Maritime TransDort
1979 end 1986, New York, based on data supplied to the UNCTAD
Secretariat by A. and P. Appledore, Ltd.
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Japan, as sources of consular revenue for Panama. Whereas in 1979
they produced 12 percent of total consular revenue, by 1983 they
produced 31 percent of the total.5s Total income to the Panama
government from ship registry and other consular activities is
around $45 million. Business generated for private sector lawyers
and accountants could be at a similar level. The ship registry
business appears not have been affected by the crisis.
However, for other sectors, the panorama has changed. By Feb-
ruary 1989 only two Japanese banks were offering complete serv-
ices. An estimated half of the Japanese community had left, and
all economic cooperation projects in the pipeline were on hold.
As mentioned above, even JETRO left, the overseas arm of MITI,
indicating a lack of faith in a short to medium term return to
stability.
The Japanese reaction to the crisis gives some indication of
the nature of Japan's interests in Panama. While Panama is a
useful and convenient place to do business, it is by no means
indispensable, as some Panamanians like to think. Nor does the
Japanese reaction give much credence to the hypothesis that Japan
is attempting to oust the United States in this part of the
world. Japan's expectations of stability in Panama, compared
with the rest of the Central American region, were related to the
high United States' presence in the country. When, despite, that
presence, the United States was not able to take action to main-
tain that stability, (it could be argued that its actions made
56 Figures from the annual reports of the Panama Contraloria Gen-
eral de la Repdblica, various years.
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the situation worse) the Japanese were in no position to chal-
lenge the United States, or to take independent action to
guarantee their interests. As a Washington lobbyist for Japanese
companies put it, "the United States gave the Japanese the signal
that Noriega was the man to deal with; then they pull the rug out
from under him, and the Japanese were left stranded. "5 7
Despite the efforts made to implement a comprehensive
security policy, to ensure Japanese interests independently, this
crisis has indicated that in this part of the world, Japan has to
rely on the United States, even though it may not agree with
United States policy. 5 8
D. POLITICAL RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
United States policy towards Central and South America is
dominated by security considerations, and Panama is no exception
to that rule. Japan does not always share the perceptions of its
principal ally regarding the nature of threats to United States
security, whether directly from the Soviet Union, or in the Third
57 Personal communication, Washington D.C. May 1988. The lob-
byist wished to remain anonymous for commercial reasons.
58 Japan clearly sees the United States as guarantor of
uninterrupted passage through the Panama Canal. As the Chief
Researcher for the Japan Maritime Research Institute wrote in
June 1988, "As long as the United States participates in the
Canal, it is almost certain that there will be no unrest, and
safety for general commercial transit will be ensured." In a sec-
tion headed "Shutdown of the Panama Canal" he writes: As long as
the United States is in charge of the management of the Canal,
like now, the Canal will not be shut down easily." Seizi Nagat-
zuka, "The Present and the Future of the Panama Canal: Its Role
in Maritime Transport and its Relation to Japan", JAMRI Bulletin.
June 1988. Unofficial translation from the original Japanese, p.
2 and 11.
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World. In the Central American region and Panama, it should be
pointed out that for the United States the complexities are
uncomfortably close to home and full of historic intimacy, while
for Japan they are physically remote and historically unfamiliar.
The United States continues to be Japan's prime reference for
policy in Latin America, so much so that personnel in the
Japanese Embassy in Washington are assigned exclusively to the
task of following United States policy in the region, and the
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan told an audience in
Boston, in February 1988, "we share the view that the economic
stability and development of Latin American countries are crucial
to the United States economy and security, and hence to the
interest of Japan."s e
However, Japan does not always conform without question to
the dictates of United States foreign policy. Japanese companies
have continued to trade with Nicaragua and Cuba, despite commer-
cial embargoes placed by the United States. When the Central
American peace plan was first signed in Guatemala (the Esquipulas
Accords) in August 1987, Japan was among the first governments to
hail this breakthrough as a hopeful indication for a negotiated
peaceful settlement, whereas the United States was wary of the
process.
In Panama, there was little problem in political relations
for Japan until the unrest began in June 1987, though no critical
59 Hiroshi Kitamura, Japan Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
"The growing role of Japan in the world", speech given before the
Japan Society of Boston, 24 February, 1988.
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choices had to be made until the ouster of President Eric Arturo
Delvalle in March 1988, when Manuel Solis Palma became Minister-
in-Charge of the Presidency. The United States continued to
recognize Delvalle, and referred to the Panamanian government as
the Noriega/Solis Palma regime, and brought pressure to bear on
several allied governments to prevent them from recognizing the
new President.
They virtually succeeded, as there were considerable protests
in Congress and in the United States administration at the news
that Japan saw no problem in dealing with an administration
headed by Solis Palma. The Japanese government backed off, and
only formally recognized the government after the Toronto G-7
Summit, in June 1988, after the Federal Republic of Germany did
so.8 0 This does not mean that the Japanese government has a
greater degree of moral approval of the present government of
Panama than the United States does, but from a diplomatic point
of view Japanese government policy is to apply the test of who
has effective control, and considers the government of a country
to be its internal affair.
Another critical moment came in May 1989, after the opposi-
tion claimed victory in the elections, their leaders were beaten,
and the elections declared null and void. The Japanese Foreign
Ministry emitted a communique that the Panamanian opposition dis-
tributed freely, though it was not published in its entirety in
60 Recognition by the FRG came only after recognition by Nobel
Peace Prize Winner, Oscar Arias, President of Costa Rica, who has
become a lodestone for democracy in the area.
____  __i
_ ____1__1_________1________________
- 32 -
the government-controlled press. A few days later, the Japanese
Ambassador's wife was making a much-publicized courtesy visit to
the Presidency.
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to move
through this diplomatic minefield, private sector interests have
voted with their feet, as indicated above. Under what conditions
would Japanese private investment and funds be likely to return
to Panama? As expressed by a the manager of a Japanese bank in
Panama, first there would have to be an agreement between the
United States and Panama; that agreement would have to be backed
up by bilateral government aid, and the renewal of aid from mul-
tilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. Only then
would the climate be right for the return of the private sec-
tor. 6
Japan's strategy as regards Panama has evolved over the last
few years. One declared Japanese vision of Panama, as the site
of a sea level canal linked with superports in Brazil and Japan
has been overtaken by events. The economic/commercial rationale
for such a combination does not appear to be there. With the
trend in the Japanese economy to "the light, the thin, the short
and the small", which expresses itself concretely in a decrease
in raw materials input per unit of production, Japan's demand for
raw materials will grow at less than the growth in its economy,
and that is probably true for other expanding economies in Asia.
61 Personal communication, interview by author in Panama City,
August 1988. The banker's expectations were that such a recovery
would be at least three to five years down the road.
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In the most recent studies of traffic demand for the Panama
Canal, admittedly for the existing lock-limited Canal, market
research findings, based on interviews with Canal users, indi-
cated among other things:
- Brazil/Argentina to Japan/Far East grain is a future trade
potential, probably bypassing the Canal,
- Brazil-Far East steel is a growing trade but mostly moves
via South Africa;
- Japan will begin to take Colombian coal in Cape-size ships
via South Africa.
- decreased automobile shipments to the United States east
coast through the Canal.
Overall, cargo using the Canal is not expected to grow at
more than 1.6% per annum through the year 2010, and ship transits
at 0.6%, as the average ship size will increase.6 2
A second vision linked Panama to Pacific Basin development.
According to this view, Panama will play an important role in the
Pacific era as the link of greatest importance between the
Pacific and Atlantic Basins. However, this would require some
adaptation, such as expansion and diversification of trade, and
greater sophistication in transport and financial services.
These factors would require modernization of the physical infra-
62 Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., Traffic Demand Forecast,
prepared for Panama Canal Commission, 1989, p. III-16 to III-23,
III-71.
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structure of the Canal, and related facilities, such as the Colon
Free Zone and of Panama's financial infrastructure.6 3
Japanese commercial and economic interests in Panama, as dis-
cussed above, certainly appeared to fit in with this scenario for
Panama. However, they received a rude shock with the development
of the political and economic crisis in Panama, which disrupted
the free flow of goods, money, people and information for which
Panama was famous.
A third interpretation of Japan's activities in Panama is as
a hedging strategy. Though it is not clear how things will
develop, the geographic location of the isthmus means it will
continue to be an important crossroads, and it makes sense for
Japan, with a domestic economy still dependent on foreign trade
and long maritime transport links, to take part in the decision-
making over future transport modes across this narrow neck of
land between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Moreover, Japan has assumed the position that it has an
international responsibility regarding the Panama Canal. Japan
is currently one of the main users of the Canal, and, while in
the future the Canal may be less important for Japan, it has to
become a good international citizen and contribute to solutions
regarding the future of the Canal, precisely because the Canal
provides an international public service.
63 Akio Hosono, "Planificacion y desarrollo a la luz de la expe-
riencia japonesa", Suplemento Embaada del Jap6n, Panama, 29
April, 1986, p. 23. This view was given by Prof. Hosono in a
speech at the Hotel Marriott, Panama City, which was later pub-
lished by the Embassy.
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As regards a sea level canal, though in the last decade it
seems to have become increasingly less viable as a commercial
proposition, new technologies for high-speed ships under research
in Japan, with the encouragement of the government, could
revolutionize shipping routes and their economic justification,
and hence the economics of a sea level canal.84 The techno super
liner 93 and the electromagnetic propulsion ship could lead to
ship speeds double or triple the current ones, which potentially
would make sea transport more attractive relative to air
transport. Moreover, at present the superconductivity technology
being developed requires sea water to function, rather than fresh
water.
Discussions of the prospects for a new canal in Panama cannot
omit consideration of the joint Nicaragua-Japan studies for a
canal, announced publicly in March 1989. While the Japanese
government has declared its commitment to the Panama studies,
indicating that those involved in the Nicaragua project are from
the private sector, this does not mean that the results would not
be available to the government.
Carrying out studies in Nicaragua is entirely consistent with
a risk-spreading and hedging strategy by Japan, promoting diver-
sification of alternatives. A canal in Nicaragua was always
included among the megaprojects of the Global Infrastructure
64 These developments are described in Stephen Kreider Yoder,
"Japan is harnessing superconductivity to conquer the high seas",
Asian Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1988, pgs. 1, 11, and in
Transport in Japan 1989, Ministry of Transport, Tokyo, 1989, pp.
49-50.
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Fund, discussed above. The uncertain outcome of the situation in
Panama may have tipped the scales in favour of initiating studies
in Nicaragua, particularly once it became clear that a military
solution to the situation in Nicaragua was unlikely.
This would not be the first time that canal alternatives in
Nicaragua and Panama have been played off one against the other
by external actors, in an attempt to bring pressure on the other.
It could also represent an attempt by Japan, using the private
sector as the spearhead, to test the waters of taking action
which, while not antagonistic to the United States, is unlikely
to meet with its official approval.
On the other hand, the prospects for bilateral cooperation
between Japan and the United States in providing strategic aid to
Central America, or other countries in Latin America, will have
been altered by this negative experience in Panama. One possible
outcome may be a greater inclination for Japan to participate in
multi-country models of cooperation, rather than bilateral ones,
such as the Sanford Commission. 8
The crisis in Panama has shown beyond doubt that the Japanese
government does not enjoy sufficient freedom of action in this
part of the world to take an independent stance. The United
States expected a certain amount of deference, and got it. It
seems quite clear also that Japan is not seeking to usurp or
65 Duke University Center for International Development Research,
Report of the International Commission for Central American
Recovery and Development,1989. The Japanese participants in the
Commission are Professor Yuzo Kamo, Aoyama Gakuin University, and
Mikio Kojima, President of JETRO, New York.
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replace the United States' role in the region. Those people in
Panama who see Japan as an alternative to the United States fail
to see Japan's true intentions-- to protect its commerce and to
help the United States.
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